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Proposal  for  a 
COUNCIL  REGULATION  CEEC) 
on  the  application of  Article  85(3)  of  the  Treaty  to  certain 
categories  of  agreements,  decisions  and  concerted 
practices  in  the  insurance  sector 
(presented  by  the  Commission) In  ltE  Judgment  of  27  January  1987  (German  Fire  Insurance,  Case 
45/85)(1)  the  Court  of  Justice  stated  that  the  Insurance  sector  was 
f:.li !y  subJect  to  Articles  85  and  86  and  to  Regulation  No  17,  thus 
clearly  rejecting  the  view,  which  at  times  had  been  expressed  in  the 
past,  that  the  prohibition  of  Article  85(1)  was  not  applicable  to  the 
insurance  sector  untl I  an  Implementing  regulation  based  on  Art!cle  87 
pa;agraph  2(c)  had  been  adopted. 
Pursuant  to  discussions  between  th&  Commission  and  the  "Comit6 
Europ6en  des  Assurances",  most  Insurers  and  their  associations  decided 
to  notify  their  agreements  and  recommendations.  Approximately  300 
not!ficat!ons  have  been  received  so  far  by  the  Commission;  this  number 
may  be  expected  to  Increase  In  the  near  future. 
An  examination  of  these  notifications  has  shown  that  only  a  few  of 
them  remain  outside  the  scope  of  application  of  Article  85(1),  either 
because  they  are  to  be  regarded  as  neutral  with  respect  to  competition 
law  (for  Instance  certain  codes  of  conduct  for  the  prevention  of 
certain  forms  of  unfair  comoetition)  or  because  they  are  covered  by 
the  Commission's  Notices  of  July  1968  concerning  agreements,  decisions 
and  concerted  practIces  ln  the  field  of  cooperation  between 
enterprfsesC2)  or  of  September  1986  concerning  agreements  of  minor 
importance.<3)  The  other  notifications  concern  agreements,  decisions 
and  concerted  practices  which  fa! i  within  the  scope  of  appl icatlon  of 
Article  35(1).  They  consist  to  a  large  extent  of  typical  agreements  or 
standardised  terms  of  business  used  regularly  and  in  large  numbers  by 
Insurance  companies  when  concluding  Insurance  contracts  with  policy 
holders or  as  a  basis  for  coooeratlon with other  insurance  companies. 
(1)  (1987)  ECR  405,  447. 
l2)  OJ  C 75  29.7.1988,  p.  3. 
(3)  OJ  C  231,  12.9.1986,  p.  2. - 2  -
In  view  of  the  quantity  of  notifications  which  poses  serious  problems 
regarding  the  Individual  treatment  of  each  case,  the  Commission 
envisages  a  general  solution  In  the  form  of  group  exemption.  The 
adoption  of  such  group  exemption  would  have  the  advantage  of  providing 
for  a  legal  framework  which  would  leave  the  Insurance  companies 
concerned  a  sufficient  degree of  flexlbll lty  regarding  the  drafting  of 
their  contracts.  Moreover,  such  exemption  would  give  the  parties  the 
benefit  of  the  highest  possible  degree  of  legal  security.  In  the 
present  case,  the material  prerequisites for  the establishment  of  group 
exemptions  are  found  to  exist.  The  notifications  received  by  the 
Commission  show  the  existence  of  a  number  of  frequently  occurring 
groups  of  agreements  and  concerted  practices  defined  on  the  basis  of 
abstract  criteria,  which  are eligible  for  a  general  exemption  from  the 
prohibition of  cartels. 




The  Commission  proposes  to  adopt  a  group  exemption once  it  has,  through 
the  treatment  of  Individual  cases,  gained  sufficient  experience  to 
comprehensively  assess  the  relevant  restrictions  of  competition  under 
Article 85(1)  and  (3). 
The  Commission's  practice  has  already  led  to  a  clarification  of  a 
number  of  Important  questions.  in  its  decisions  "Nuovo  Cegam"<4>  and 
"Fire  lnsurance",C5)  the  Commission  clearly  expressed  Its  view  that 
cooperation  between  Indemnity  Insurers  In  which  loss  statistics  are 
jointly  analysed  and  !n  which  common  risk  premium  tariffs  based  on 
common  accident  statistics,  excluding  any  loading  Instruments  such  as 
administrative  costs,  Intermediation  costs  and  profits  (pure  premiums) 
are  elaborated  and  applied,  may  be  acceptable.  However,  such  would  In 
OJ  L  99,  11 . 4.1984'  p.  29;  14th  Report  on  Competition  Polley 
(1984),  point  76. 
OJ  L  35,  7.2.1985'  p.  20;  14th  Heport  on  Competition  Pol icy 
{ 1984).  point  75. 
3 of  commercial  premium  tariffs  (Le.  the  premiums  actually  charged  to 
pol !cy  holders  compr!s!ng  the  above-mentioned  loading  lnstruments).CS) 
This  position  has  bean  confirmed  by  the  Court  of  Justice  In  the  above-
mentioned  uGerman  Flre  !nsuranceh  case.C7)  !n  Its decision  "Protection 
and  lndemnlty  Clubs"(8)  the  Commission  considered  agreements  on  mutual 
Insurance  to  be  e! iglble  for  exemption  u.ncter  certain  circumstances. 
Moreover,  the  Commission  will  soon  adopt  two  further  exemptlon 
decisions  concerning  respectively  a  reinsurance  pool(9)  and 
cooperation  In  the  field of  industrial  fire  !nsuranca.C10) 
The  Commission  intends  to  deal  with  additional  Individual  cases  by  way 
of  forma I  decision.  or  administrative  'comfort'  I et ter  after 
publication  of  the  main  contents  of  the  agreements.  With  a  view  to 
preparing  this  programme,  the  Commission  has  undertaken  an  examination 
and  evaluation of  the  pending  notifications which  permits  the  following 
conclusions  to  be  drawn  regarding  the  contents  of  the  future  group 
exemption. 
It  Is  proposed  that  this  cover  types  of  agreements,  decisions  and 
concerted practices concerning: 
-the elaboration  and  application of  common  risk  premium  tariffs  based 
purely  on  col lectlvely  ascertained  statistics  or  loss  experience 
and/or  of  standard  policy conditions; 
-cooperation  in  the  field  of  co-insurance  and  reinsurance,  In 
particular  In  the  forms  of  groups  and  pools; 
-cooperation  In  respect  of  claims settlement  procedures; 
-cooperation  In  respect  of  testing and  acceptance of  security devices; 
cooperation  !n  respect  of  registers of  and  Information  on  aggravated 
risks. 
(6)  See  also  Notice  pursuant  to  Article  19(3)  of  Counci!  Regulation  No 
17/62,  oj  C  259,  12.10.1989.  p.  3  •concordato  !tal lano  lncendio". 
(7)  See  reference  No  1. 
(8)  OJ  L  376,  31.12.1985,  p.  2· 
' 
15th  Report  on  Competition  Pol Icy 
(1985),  point  69. 
(9)  Not ice  pursuant  to  Article  19(3)  of  Council  ::;u!at !on  No  17/62,  OJ 
C  203,  l'L~L Hl89,  p.  2  "Teko". 
(10)  See  reference  No  6. 
4 Baslca! 1y,  the  conditions under  which  such  agreements  could  be  exempted 
are  the  following  : 
-Common  risk  premium  tariffs  basea  purely  on  col lectlvely  ascertained 
statistics  or  loss  experience  may  only  be  elaborated  If  they 
constitute  common  actuarial  calculations  based  on  joint  loss 
statistics with  the  aim  to  provide  a  technical  balance  on  which  the 
insurance  Industry  can  operate,  to  the  exclusion of  any  loadings  for 
Instance  for  lntermedlalrles'  commissions,  administrative  costs  or 
profits.  As  the Court  of  Justice  found  In  Its above-mentioned  rul lng, 
an  exemption  may  In  principle  not  be  granted  for  commercial  premium 
tariffs,  I .e.  tariffs  that  Include  not  only  the  cover  of  costs 
Incurred  In  relation  to  claims  Insured,  but  also  such  supplementary 
loadings  as  described  above.  Such  tariffs should  furthermore  only  be 
exempted  if  they  are  established  as  non-binding  recommendations, 
leaving  the  participants free  to depart  from  them. 
-Standard  policy  conditions,  although  positive  in  the  sense  that  they 
permit  a  comparison  of  the  extent  of  coverage  and  prices,  thus 
contributing  towards  transparency  for  consumers,  should  only  be 
exempted  If  they  are  Issued  as  recommendatIons  I  eav I  ng  the 
participating  companies  free  to  depart  from  the  standard  to  meet 
Individual  customers'  needs.  Furthermore,  standard  pol !cy  clauses 
should  not  unduly  restrict  competition,  for  example  by  uniform 
recommendatIon  of  a  very  long  contractua I  duratIon  wl thout 
corresponding  economic  advantages,  thus  unduly  preventing  pol ley-
holders  from  seeking  cover  with  competing  companies,  or  by  generally 
recommending  standard  conditions  systematically  excluding  particular 
types of  cover,  (e.g.  for  natural  catastrophes or  nuclear  accidents). 
This  exemption  cannot,  and  does  not,  affect  Member  Stales·  right  to 
enact  and  apply  their  own  consumer  protection  legislation  In  this 
area,  provided  this  remains  wlth!n  the  I lmits  set  by  Community  law. -----·-----·----·---------------------
which  !ns~rancs 
c~mpanles  cooperate  to  set  up  co-Insurance  or  reinsurance  (or  mixed 
~o-:nsurance and  reinsurance»  arrangements,  especially  !n  the  form  of 
pools  "Jr  groups,  r,,:,r it  pos;t lV!:t  cons:oerat !on  in  part !cular  when: 
they  open  the  ma.rket  for  c.::>rnpan!es  wh!ch  otherwise  could  not  east !y 
enter  It  alone,  due  to  limited capacity or  expertise,  or  !f they  lead 
to  a  coverage  such  not  usuai !y  covered  by 
individual  companies.  Alt  such  schomes  may  restrict  competition 
tetween  tne  partlclcat!ng  companies  In  the  reinsurance  and/or  In  the 
:lirect  Insurance  field,  they  t..:ouid  be  exemptf'd  under  the  condition 
that  effective competition on  the market  !s guaranteed. 
However,  such  agreements  should  not  be  exempted  if  there  is  a  danger 
of  monopol izatlon  of  the  market  or  If  their  rules  would  enable  a 
participant  to  abuse  Its  economic  power  ..  Additionally,  they  should 
not  be  conctrued  In  such  a  way  as  to make  parties  lose  the!r  autonomy 
completely  anj  they  should  not  entirely  prevent  parties  from  seeking 
reinsurance  cover  or  particlpat!ng  In  a  co-insurance  arrangement 
elsewhere. 
- ReGard[ng  arrangements  on  acceierated  and  s!mpl !fled  procedures  for 
the  settlement  of  c!aims,  especial !y  In  the  case  of  damages  covered 
by  several  insurance  contracts,  such  arrangements  do  not,  as  a  rule, 
restrict  competition.  Nevertheless,  they  should  not  be  app! led  In  a 
way  detrimental  to  the  Interests of  pol Icy-holders. 
-Cooperation  arrangements  In  the  field  of  testing  and  acceptance  of 
security  devices  have  the  advantage  of  fac! fltat!ng  underwriting  by 
eliminating  the  !leed  for  individual  examination  in  each  particular 
case.  They  can  be  considered  el !gib!e  for  exemption  if  the  approval 
systems  themse 1  ves  are  open  to  a I I  manufacturers  or  fItters,  are 
based  on  purely  ob)ect!vc  and  aual !tatlve  criteria  and  do  not 
dlssu.ade  person::,  from  submitting  to  th!s  system  by  way  of 
d1sproport :onat.e  cost.  such  arrangements  are  frequently  accompanied 
by  recommendations  aimed  to  ensure  that  the  granting  or  refusal  of 
approval  is  reflt:lcted  ln  some  way  In  the  participating  companies' 
underwriting  or  raUng  po!iC1es.  Recommencatlons  cd  this  kind  would 
on;y  be  acceptab!e  If  they  '"main  pun;<  nor-binding  terms  of 
t~o~~e  :>tandards. -- 6  -
- Gco;:.~eraUoil  between  Insurers  wlth  reg~_rd  to  registers  of  or 
information  systems  on  aggravated  risks  can  help  to  prevent  fraud. 
Although  In  general  not  aimed  at  a  restriction  of  competition, 
participation  In  such  systems  should  not  be  obi !gatcry and  should  not 
deprive  companies  of  the  possibility  to  Insure  such  risks  at  their 
own  evaluation.  Further,  they  should  not  be  operated  to  the  detriment 
of  the  consumer. 
In  the  group  exemption  regulation,  an  'opposition  procedure'  should  be 
foreseen,  so  that  companies  may  notify  thelr  arrangements  In  cases  of 
doubt  of  legal lty of  certain  provisions with  regard  to  the  regulation. 
The  benefIt  of  thIs  procedure  shou I  d  be  accorded  to  provIsIons  whIch 
have  not  been  explicitly  exempted  but  which  nevertheless  do  not  fall 
under  the  category of  unacceptable or  'black'  clauses. 
I I I.  Procedural  aspects 
Before  the  Commission  may  establish  a  group  exemption,  It  Is 
necessary  that  the Counci I  adopt  an  enabl lng  regulation under  Article 
87(2)(b)  of  the  EEC  Treaty,  empowering  the  Commission  to  declare, 
pursuant  to  Article  85(3),  that  Article  85(1)  does  not  apply  to 
certain  categories  of  agreements,  decisions  and  concerted  practices 
In  the  insurance sector. 
The  proposal  annexed  hereto  takes  into  account  the  orientation 
described  above.  The  draft  Council  regulation  Is  conceived  along  the 
lines of  Regulations  No  19/65  and  No  2821/71. 